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The legacy of D. C. S. Oosthuizen is best approached by viewing his work as an
ongoing engagement with the philo sophical ideas and assump tions of his time.
In this discussion, I will try to interpret his work from something of a bird’s eye
view as engaging in dialogue with three philo sophical gener a tions: the
Afrikaner intel lec tuals of his own gener ation; the liberal and broadly secular
culture of English-language South African univer sities in the 1960s; and the
new radicalism emerging after Sharpeville, initially in such contexts as the
University Christian Movement, that was to become prominent in the 1980s, a
decade after Oosthuizen’s death.
I do not mean by this to suggest that these three gener a tional engage ments
represent three different periods of Oosthuizen’s life. In various ways they
overlap with and inform each other. But I believe that under standing their
conti nuity is essential to grasping the integrity of Oosthuizen’s work. That
integrity – the sense of his being ‘made out of one piece’, in the Afrikaans
usage, rather than presenting different personae to the world according to what
circum stances required – made a lasting impression on those who knew him.
I would surmise that it is also part of the reason why Oosthuizen’s name is
linked to the celebration of academic freedom at Rhodes University. For
academic freedom is not just a legal right that a university enjoys in a formal
and passive sense, but a commitment to constantly exploring the vital questions 
of the day in an honest and forth right way, without being swayed by consid er -
ations of power or fashion.
In classical Greece, the terms referring to free speech did not imply that one
could speak without fear of the conse quences. They implied instead that you
lived in a community whose way of life promoted the civic virtues that would
enable you to take on the risks of speaking freely when circum stances
demanded that of you. It implied that you would be true to yourself rather than
saying what others wished to hear.
The contem porary conception of rights as a kind of protection is often used
to disguise relations of domination. Celebrating academic freedom on this
model – that is, on the model of the right of a homeless person to buy a mansion,
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or start a business, if only they can raise the money, or consti tu tional rights that
can be defended by those who can afford the lawyer’s bills – can become a way
of ensuring that the freedom you celebrate is never actually put to use.
II Oosthuizen in Stellenbosch
Oosthuizen’s engagement with Afrikaner intel lectual life at Stellenbosch in the 
1940s began his philo sophical career and left its mark on all his subse quent
work. Of the three overlapping gener a tions I spoke of earlier, the Afrikaner
intel lectual group of his own gener ation is the only one we can speak of his
engagement as a relatively completed project, not in the sense that he would
have had nothing more to say if he had lived longer, but in the sense that we can
see a clear trajectory to his devel opment in this context.
Oosthuizen came to Stellenbosch in 1943. He became perhaps the central
figure in a remarkably gifted and innovative group of young philos o phers who,
by 1947, if not earlier, were exploring new lines of argument and analysis that
were unfamiliar to their teachers and were to leave their mark for decades to
come both in Stellenbosch and in the broader field of South African intel lectual
life.
The most innovative among them were Oosthuizen himself, James
Oglethorpe, who arrived at Stellenbosch in 1942, completed an M.A. in
philosophy and a degree in theology, and later became a DRC missionary in
Zambia, and Johan Degenaar, who began his studies in 1944, was later to
abandon theology, was appointed as a lecturer in philosophy in 1948, and was a
legendary teacher there until his retirement in 1991.
Although these three were most prominent, there can be no doubt, if one
reads the graduate theses and student newspapers of the time, that the ideas that
seized hold of them provided a vocab ulary for a far wider group – a vocab ulary
drawn largely, though by no means wholly, from the existen tialism of Soren
Kierkegaard.
It is highly unusual – in any historical context, but certainly in South African
intel lectual history – to find a group of students pioneering new trends in this
way. This became possible in Stellenbosch of the mid-1940s only because
philosophy had come to occupy such a crucial role in its larger political and
intel lectual culture, and the stakes for philo sophical argument had become so
high. If not literally a matter of life and death, then at least a matter of heresy and 
orthodoxy, of being true to the past or the future, keeping ties of solidarity with
the Afrikaner community or taking on demands that were seen as essential to
progress and devel opment.
Stellenbosch was the main educa tional centre for the Dutch- and later
Afrikaans-speaking population of the Western Cape. In the aftermath of the
South African War, it had a pivotal role both in the Afrikaans language
movement and in the devel opment of Afrikaner nation alism. But the social and
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economic position of Afrikaners in the Western Cape remained very different
from that of the rest of the country.
This was the one part of South Africa in which Afrikaners had a clear and
long-established stake in capitalism. The wheat and wine farmers of the
Western Cape formed the oldest stratum of the ruling class; a powerful and
affluent elite that had been the major benefi ciaries of Willem Adriaan van der
Stel’s fall from grace as governor in 1707. This was also the region in which
Afrikaner insti tu tions, the church, district banks, newspapers and publi ca tions,
were most firmly entrenched.
In no other region of the country was Afrikaner political and intel lectual life
faced with the same sharp dilemma between embracing modernistion, which
was essential to the interests of the capitalist social basis of its insti tu tions, and
opposing it in order to secure their political alliances with Afrikaners in the
northern provinces, seeking to mobilise newly-urbanised workers and an
embattled petty bourgeoisie against a hostile and alien mining industry. In this
context, a distinctive philo sophical tradition emerged at Stellenbosch that
could neither fully embrace modernity nor resist it in the name of a pre-modern
ideal.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, academic philosophy in South
Africa was largely a colonial variant of British Hegelianism, sometimes more
and sometimes less explicitly at the same time intended as a justi fi cation of the
historical design of British imperi alism. By the time Oosthuizen began his
studies in the 1940s, philosophy at the other Afrikaans univer sities had orien -
tated itself toward a neo-Calvinist cosmology. At the English-language univer -
sities, philosophy was often oriented toward science, adopting the positivist
temper of the early philosophy of language, often becoming increas ingly
technical and removed from the topical issues of the day. Stellenbosch
remained in a category of its own, devel oping a philo sophical modernism in a
largely ethical register, often critical of the claims of science.
A special burden was placed on the disci pline of philosophy at Stellenbsoch
by the protracted heresy trial of Professor Johannes du Plessis of the theological 
seminary. Proceedings in the Presbytery of Stellenbosch, then in the Synod of
the Dutch Reformed Church, and finally in the Supreme Court, continued from
1928 until his eventual dismissal from the seminary, though not from the
university, in 1932. There was consid erable support for du Plessis at
Stellenbosch. In the aftermath of his dismissal, the numbers of theology
students declined dramat i cally and the study of philosophy thrived.
By the early 1940s, almost a quarter of graduate students at Stellenbosch
were in the Department of Philosophy. Oosthuizen and his contem po raries
came into a disci pline that seemed to be opening up ever broader new horizons,
but found that larger devel op ments within Afrikaner politics were in the
process of narrowing them down. His teacher, J. F. Kirsten, responded to this
dilemma with a kind of dualism: on the one hand, recog nising that our
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knowledge of the world is in constant flux; on the other hand, asserting that
eternal values anchor us in the midst of it; and then blurring the line between
them.
Oosthuizen and his contem po raries effec tively exploded this attempt to
reconcile the norms of science and religion, arguing instead that all religious
and ethical values required a leap of faith, an individual commitment that
always had to be actively renewed. Rather than smoothing over the crisis of the
philos opher under pressure to conform to a national movement, Oosthuizen
argued that every moment of life was a moment of crisis and decision.
Conformity with a dogmatic system of values was no more than an evasion of
ethical and intel lectual respon si bility.
This Stellenbosch existen tialism drew centrally on the work of Kierkegaard.
This writer’s work was written in Danish in the 1830s and 1840s. It was trans -
lated into German in the first decades of the twentieth century and fragments of
it made their way into theological discussion in South Africa in the 1920s and
1930s. Trans lation of his writings into English began in 1935. By 1947,
Kierkegaard’s work was at the centre of graduate research at Stellenbosch and
it remained so for years to come. Oosthuizen was probably the first of this
gener ation to seize upon Kierkegaard and certainly the one who used the philo -
sophical framework he provided with most creativity and intensity.
Oosthuizen’s M.A. thesis, completed in 1949, is an extraor dinary work.
Entitled Die Verklaringsdrang (roughly, The Urge to Explain, although
verklaar suggest something more compre hensive than the English word,
explain) and subtitled Aesthetic-comical and fragmentary consid er ations
concerning the philosophy of expla nation in the direction of an existential
dialectic, its main text was no longer than 39 pages, followed by 82 pages of
endnotes. The text contains no direct reference to any philos opher, other than
brief discussion of Kant, although the notes refer to an extensive range of
authors. But the argument is Oosthuizen’s own.
Briefly, he argues that the urge to explain, which makes possible the dialec -
tical reasoning – that is, reasoning that follows the movement of contra dic tions, 
rather than reasoning axiom at i cally from consistent state ments – that is needed
in order to provide a universal and necessary expla nation of reality, requires a
certain attitude. This he describes as the ‘will to freedom’. However, this will to
freedom proves to be self-undermining. To establish an uncon di tional
beginning for all reasoning, it must negate all premises drawn from conven -
tional wisdom. In willing freedom, according to Oosthuizen, the subject is
deprived of all existing ties, and has no choice but to cast himself before God,
where his true self is realised.
It is a pessi mistic, even despairing, conclusion, and Oosthuizen is the first to
point this out. A study of this kind is comical, he says, revealing that the author
‘stands in an aesthetic relationship to matters that he should take seriously’ –
that is, ethically. Of course, he took them very seriously indeed.
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Something of the same pessimism stands out in the student journalism of
Oosthuizen and his contem po raries. Oosthuizen and Oglethorpe wrote prolif i -
cally for popular publi cation. Both of them were editors of Die Stellenbosse
Student in the years immedi ately after the National Party election victory of
1948. Oglethorpe attacked apartheid directly, in a similarly existen tialist
register, arguing that by supporting apartheid for the sake of ‘the right of the
nation to survive’ the DRC had abandoned ‘its most precious possession, its
faith’. Oosthuizen was more guarded, arguing, for example, that all sides to the
contro versy over university apartheid were equally deter mined to establish a
new conformity and were fearful of real individ u ality.
The result of this gener a tion’s work was to present young Afrikaner intel lec -
tuals with a choice where none had existed before – that is, where the terms had
not been developed in which to artic ulate that choice. It was not a choice
between supporting or opposing the existing social and political order, but
rather a choice between loyalty to that order or loyalty to the self in whose name
that order had been estab lished. It was, let us say, a modest kind of opposition to 
apartheid. But it placed an explosive charge beneath the façade of apartheid
rule. It provided the impetus for Oosthuizen’s continued enquiries into the
ethics of apartheid and resis tance to apartheid.
III After Stellenbosch – Oosthuizen’s Trajectory
Oosthuizen never abandoned the themes that he had acquired from his work on
Kierkegaard, but he pursued them in a very different philo sophical idiom. I
discussed his earlier work in its local context in Stellenbosch. To under stand
the choices that led to his shift to analytical philosophy in his later work, it is
necessary to consider the larger context of Western philosophy in the twentieth
century.
Oosthuizen’s career, once his student days were over, was defined by
adherence to not one, but both, of the major currents of twenti eth-century
philosophy: the school of phenom en ology pioneered by Edmund Husserl, and
analytical philosophy, with which the names of G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell,
and Ludwig Wittgenstein are most often associated. These are the two currents
that most clearly express the distinc tively twenti eth-century philo sophical
project of overcoming metaphysics – that is, leaving the attempt to discover a
true structure of reality to the natural sciences – while seeking to keep alive
questions of truth, meaning, and value. By the time Oosthuizen began his
studies in the Nether lands, this project was coming clearly into view.
Husserl’s phenom en ology undertook to found knowledge on a study of the
basic processes of consciousness that made it possible, reducing the study of
consciousness to the question of how phenomena appear to it. That is, instead of 
seeking to grasp a larger purpose of the human mind, or a great idea under
which its contents could be organised, it developed the proce dures that would
make it possible to say ‘this is red’ of a red object – to capture its redness, as
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opposed to other qualities of the same object. It sought to integrate the findings
of science into philosophy and also, in Husserl’s later work, to criticise the
philo sophical orien tation of the sciences.
Analytical philosophy began similarly with a critique of metaphysics and
idealism in general. Rather than showing on the basis of logic that, for example,
God exists or the world is good, it asked about what was meant by state ments
about God or the good. By focusing on language and logic, it was able to avoid
conflict with the natural sciences or even, as in the case of logical positivism,
take them as their model.
Oosthuizen’s doctoral studies in the Nether lands dealt mainly with Husserl,
and his first academic articles provide careful restate ments of the problems and
perspec tives of Husserl’s phenom en ology. After a year of study at Oxford in
1962, working with Gilbert Ryle, his orien tation shifted decisively toward
analytical philosophy. His continuing interest in philo sophical questions
related to perception, imagi nation, and related issues testifies to the enduring
influence of Husserl, even after Oosthuizen had abandoned the idiom of
phenom en ology.
The range and intel li gence of Oosthuizen’s writing and teaching was crucial
to estab lishing a clear identity for philosophy at the English-language univer -
sities in South Africa, casting it as a modern and secular disci pline, capable of
fitting in with an intel lectual climate often defined by the sciences. He was not
alone in this, and it would likely have happened without him. But he set a
template in many ways for the next gener ation of English-speaking philos o -
phers in South Africa, a number of them his former students.
Put differ ently, Oosthuizen provided a mode of analysis that enabled
philosophy in South Africa to function with a global network, although
sometimes at the cost of paying far less attention to its South African context
than Oosthuizen himself would have counte nanced. His use of analytical
philosophy created a model for philosophy as an academic speciali sation, but
surely he never intended that it become a technical disci pline acces sible to
specialist alone.
Oosthuizen himself never gave a program matic description of his work in
analytical philosophy. But the aspect of it that most attracted him stands out
clearly. It is well captured in a famous passage from the preface to G. E.
Moore’s Principia Ethica (1903), which might be read as an early manifesto for 
the analytic project in philosophy:
It appears to me that in Ethics, as in all other philo sophical studies, the diffi culties and
disagree ments of which history is full, are mainly due to a very simple cause: namely to the 
attempt to answer questions without discov ering precisely what question it is which you
desire to answer. I do not know how far this source of error would be done away, if philos -
o phers would try to discover what question they were asking, before they set about to
answer it; for the work of analysis and distinction is often very difficult... But I am inclined 
to think that, in many cases a resolute attempt would be inclined to ensure success.
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Moore’s programme offers a prospect of avoiding conflict about what
questions are most important and how they are to be answered, or at least
postponing it until all other means have been exhausted. It creates a prelim inary 
field of discussion in which no-one need feel that their beliefs are under attack.
All that is at stake is exactly what question they are seeking to answer in holding 
that belief. Once they have done that, it may of course turn out that there are in
fact two or more questions at stake, each of which require a different answer, or
that there is a logical or conceptual mismatch between question and answer, so
that analysis of the logical form of a specific belief might take the place of more
conten tious discussion of its merits.
What was a new prospect when Moore offered it in 1903 is by now the air
that most philosophy students breathe in the Anglo-American world, including
the tradi tionally English-language univer sities in South Africa. For Oosthuizen 
in South Africa in the early 1960s, analytical philosophy offered the hope of
making philo sophical discussion possible where it was frequently made impos -
sible by funda mental ideological conflicts.
Oosthuizen’s personal and philo sophical commitment to a Socratic model of 
teaching and commu ni cation was thwarted by the insis tence – partic u larly
among Afrikaner neo-Calvinist philos o phers, including his colleagues at
Bloemfontein – that religious commit ments were decisive for all philo sophical
questions and that, short of persuading your inter locutor to adopt your own
belief system, no philo sophical progress was possible.
Analytical philosophy provided a modest programme, but one that could
take small steps at least in the direction of clari fying beliefs and assump tions
through debate and dialogue where no such progress was possible before. It
offered the start ing-point not of philo sophical or theological abstraction, but of
the everyday meanings of words, of concrete examples that would enable
anyone who under stood them to make the distinc tions required to bring them in
relation with our concepts.
The weaknesses of the analytical approach might not have been as apparent.
It never addressed the possi bility that conflicting philo sophical or ethical
beliefs might be related not to misun der standing about what question was being 
answered, but to real social conflicts. In a context where beliefs were confused,
or sought to respond to a range of separate problems at once, it could provide no
incentive for anyone holding such beliefs to submit them to philo sophical
analysis. In this sense, it projected the philo sophical classroom onto the rest of
the world, assuming the commitment to intel lectual clarity that Moore may
have expected from his colleagues at Cambridge.
Above all, this approach ran the danger of multi plying distinc tions and
quali fi ca tions indef i nitely – that is, without a clear sense of the degree of clari fi -
cation needed to guide individual or collective norms or actions. If the main
weapons in its armoury are those of logical and conceptual clari fi cation, what
incentive is there turn to other tasks? That incentive had to come from the real
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world rather than from philo sophical enquiry. But much depended on the
philos o pher’s capacity to recognise and interpret the demands of their time and
place.
IV Oosthuizen and the Radical Challenge
Oosthuizen’s critique of Afrikaner nation alism came to a kind of culmi nation
in the papers collected as Analyses of Nation alism in the first issue of
Occasional Papers of the Department of Philosophy at Rhodes University
(subse quently called Philo sophical Papers). It was to be developed further in
topical lectures, largely criticising attempts to justify apartheid on moral
grounds. But increas ingly the focus of Oosthuizen’s work shifted toward the
ethical problems involved in resisting injustice – a shift that is evident in the
essays collected by Ian Bunting under the title The Ethics of Illegal Action.
Although he seldom, if ever, refers explicitly to the emerging movement
among students and Chris tians to develop a radical critique of apartheid and
attempt new forms of organi sation and protest, it is clear that it is this gener ation 
that he is addressing. In the vacuum created by the crushing of African resis -
tance to apartheid, culmi nating in the Rivonia trial in 1964 and the impris -
onment of the ANC leadership, white student activism took on a signif icant role 
in extra-parliamentary opposition to apartheid. The founding of the Christian
Institute, under the leadership of Beyers Naudé, led to new forms of activism
within the churches.
The disso lution of the Student Christian Associ ation in South Africa also
created an opening for the formation of the University Christian Movement in
1967, much influ enced by devel op ments in the United States, including Black
theology and protests against the Vietnam War. The UCM had a strong
presence in Grahamstown, with Basil Moore serving as its first president.
Oosthuizen spoke at UCM meetings on occasion and his support was clearly
valued by its members.
Probably the most extensive, if one-sided, account of the UCM is that
provided in the Sixth Interim Report, published in 1975, of the Commission of
Inquiry into Certain Organi sa tions, appointed by Prime Minister John Vorster.
The Report does what it can to portray the UCM alter na tively as a front for
Marxism and Black theology (or to suggest that these are inter changeable) and
to question its Christian creden tials. It makes what it can of any sign of sexual or 
drug-related activity, or indeed any sign that UCM members formed part of a
broader youth culture, with its charac ter istic patterns of exper i men tation and
confusion. The Commis sion’s reasoning is almost always tenden tious and
often just absurd. But it is probably true that many of the activists drawn to the
UCM and similar organi sa tions were not always clear about what they were
rebelling against.
There are many reasons to suppose that the radical activists of this gener -
ation would have been disposed to listen carefully to what Oosthuizen had to
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say. First, his critique of apartheid was posed in moral, rather than pragmatic
terms. He was not arguing in the first place that apartheid was a
counter-productive way of defending white interests, as many liberals did.
Second, although his ethics often rested on the most widely-accepted usages, 
it kept a conception of the individual as consti tuted in encounter with other
people. He and others of his gener ation of Stellenbosch existentialists never
really adopted the liberal model of the human being as the possessor of her or
his attributes, values, etc. ‘A Christian act of defiance’, he writes in the title
essay of The Ethics of Illegal Action, ‘is unique and intimately connected with
the character and history of the person who for Christian reasons feels that he,
and no-one else, ought to act in this illegal manner on this particular occasion’.
Third, the nature of this fledgling movement was such that it was naturally
oriented towards philosophy. How strongly this need was felt, may be seen
from the way in which the philo sophical work of Richard Turner was assim i -
lated in student organi sa tions and the trade union movement in the early 1970s.
Fourth, and not to be under es ti mated, Oosthuizen’s personal qualities – his
honesty, gener osity, and lack of pretension – must surely have made him an
attractive figure to a gener ation faced with hierarchy, privilege, and entrenched
hypocrisy. A professor without concern for the outward signs of status is the
exception today, and was surely that much more excep tional then!
It is easy to imagine that many individuals in that emerging movement drew
strength from Oosthuizen’s critical contri bu tions, but hard to see how the
movement they were part of could have done so. His philo sophical ethics, in
dealing with illegal forms of resis tance, tended constantly toward the conser -
vative middle ground. ‘A Christian act of defiance’, he says in the same
sentence I quoted earlier, ‘will have to be such that it is undoubtedly Christian,
that is, the one and only appro priate reaction for a Christian to undertake had he
been in that situa tion’. He constantly puts himself in the position of the
individual standing at the threshold of political commitment, ruling out of
consid er ation the possi bility that the threshold might be crossed.
In his own life, as distinct from his philo sophical work, it is clear that
Oosthuizen was less hesitant. One of his former colleagues has described
Oosthuizen’s role in attempting to skirt the banning order on Terence Beard, in
defiance of the Grahamstown security police. In that context, he embodied
another ethic, as in his testimony on behalf of Hugh Lewin, his former student
convicted of sabotage initiated by the ARM. But Oosthuizen could make of this
ethic a larger, collec tively acces sible, political horizon.
Oosthuizen’s ethic of dialogue was in this sense self-defeating, it seems to
me. To preserve the position as potential inter locutor from which he could
engage in the widest possible range of dialogue, he forfeited a political position
that could actually be put forward in that dialogue. Although he abandoned
Kierkegaard’s existen tialism, he retained its pessimism about any theory of
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ethical and political change. Dialogue alone – that is, dialogue without a theory
of ethical change – became dialogue without a real inter locutor.
V Concluding Remarks
There is much in Oosthuizen’s life and work that richly deserves to be remem -
bered and kept alive on an occasion like this one: the ethical intent of his
philoso phising; his consistent focus on the burning questions of South African
society, no matter how painful or intrac table; his intel lectual seriousness,
insisting that short-cuts, or failure to think things through, would be a recipe for
trouble; his willingness to explore new approaches and perspec tives, drawing
on existen tialism, phenom en ology and analytical philosophy without treating
any of them as sectarian truth. All of these qualities were manifest in a peculiar
integrity, and the humility that was its counterpart.
Oosthuizen’s limita tions were the result of the same qualities for which he is
rightly remem bered. In a deeply-divided society, he found himself unable to
locate himself – or more accurately, his philo sophical work – on either side of
the divide, at a time when the emerging movement for liber ation was criti cally
in need of a philo sophical framework. Whatever Oosthuizen’s personal sympa -
thies may have been, his conception of philosophy required him to remain at the 
threshold, to focus on the tasks of the philo sophical prepa ration in a way that
effec tively denied there was a historical task for which this prepa ration was
needed.
The question of whether Oosthuizen’s work will speak to a fourth philo -
sophical gener ation in South Africa – of whether his legacy will have a life that
extends beyond those who knew and respected him personally – depends on the 
unfin ished work of the period of radical critique and protest whose begin nings
he saw in organi sa tions such as the Christian Institute and the UCM. 
The study-programmes, workshops, and often inchoate ‘happen ings’ of
NUSAS and the UCM took on more definite form in the period after the Soweto 
uprising of 16 June, 1976, and especially in the insur rec tionary years of the
1980s. Worker education projects in FOSATU and later in many unions affil -
iated to COSATU, the labour movement’s commitment to democ ra ti sation as
an educative force, the project of People’s Education initiated by the Soweto
Education Crisis Committee, the growth of a Marxist histo ri og raphy of South
Africa, and the intel lectual radicalism of university depart ments or clusters of
depart ments, community newspapers and small, often illegal or semi-legal,
publi ca tions – all of these held out the promise that systemic analysis of the
funda mental struc tures of society, by or in engagement with large numbers of
oppressed people, could become both a tool of liber ation and part of its content.
Whatever their differ ences, all these initia tives, and others, were fueled by the
belief that a free society, after the end of apartheid, would massively increase
the space and resources for critical enquiry and debate.
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This is not what the end of apartheid has brought. On the contrary, space and
resources have been ration alised, commer cialised, placed in the service of the
market and of capitalist profit ability, and the perspective of public discussion is 
that of the technocrat. Sadly, the univer sities are playing their part in the
re-orientation of South African intel lectual life away from engagement with
such questions and toward the needs of the market place and techno cratic
solutions imposed from above.
Looking back on that moment of the 1980s – let us say, the long  decade of
the 1980s, with its roots going back to the 1960s and its impact surviving here
and there until today – it may seem that some part of its conception of liber ation
was a product of the excitement of the times. But it drew also on deeper and
longer-standing patterns of South African intel lectual life, which are increas -
ingly forgotten or discarded now.
One of the major analysts of the liber ation struggles of southern Africa, John
Saul, in his forth coming book, writes about the ‘next liber ation struggle’ in
southern Africa. That struggle is still in embryo, and it is as easy to scoff at its
manifes ta tions as it was forty years ago to scoff at radical student organi sa tions. 
It will have to emerge on a very different, far more globalised, terrain than did
the struggles against apartheid, Portugese colonial rule, Rhodesian UDI, and
the like.
If Oosthuizen’s legacy is to live on at all, this will happen through his work
being developed to that it has something to say in that context. Whether his
name is attached to that legacy is perhaps not the most pressing issue. On an
occasion like this, it is right for us to celebrate Oosthuizen and commit
ourselves to the ideals of academic freedom. But if this is to be more than a
senti mental gesture, it also requires us to think about how the larger intel lectual
and moral endeavour which Oosthuizen exemplified can provide resources for
that next liber ation struggle.
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